Hong Kong: Picking a fight with China probably isn't a good idea

Watching events in Hong Kong play out – even from thousands of miles away – left an anticipatory sick twinge in one’s stomach. Their conclusion now appears more likely to end with a whimper than a bang.

There was a “deju vu all over again” element to what we were seeing. It was not just the quarter-century ago Tiananmen Square massacres. It is the more recent, ended badly, “democracy” surges in Tehran, Cairo, Damascus, and Tripoli. The prototype “color” revolution immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union no longer appear to be the paradigm for peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. And February’s bloodshed in Kiev is still being played out in sanguinary exchanges on Ukraine’s eastern frontier.

The blunt reality is governments have an overwhelming monopoly of force. If they choose to employ it against their essentially unarmed citizenry, they will prevail. Armed forces are increasingly divorced from citizens and/or their beliefs. They have a greater commitment to the regime which delivers benefits and status; these are real advantages, while democracy is nebulous, perhaps “nice to have” but not necessary.

As for Hong Kong, the issue is the degree to which the careful departure scenario that London constructed with China will hold. Can “one nation; two systems” work in continued practice, or was it always implicitly recognized as permitting London a “decent interval” to disengage, leaving Beijing free to slam down its heavy hand when it chose?

Make no mistake. The nicely parsed provisions of the 1997 UK-PRC agreement are as binding as were the 1994 provisions for the independence/non-interference with Ukraine as agreed by U.S.-Russia-United Kingdom in return for Ukraine surrendering its nuclear weapons. In short, binding until Russia decided otherwise.

The proximate cause for the demonstrations is Beijing’s plan to vet candidates for Hong Kong elections. This is simply a pretext to tighten its political control and strangle the last vestiges of British-style socio-political freedoms.

Still, it is clear Beijing would prefer Hong Kong return to tranquility, delivering fiscal benefits for China. Chinese leadership realizes a Tiananmen-style crackdown would generate international opprobrium – maybe even a toothless UN resolution of condemnation. It wants to avoid such nasty infelicities, but such concern is hardly paramount, indeed, international reaction is no more than a tertiary worry.

[ On the other hand: David Kilgour: The students should have their say ]

First and foremost, Beijing seeks to avoid Hong Kong “infecting” the mainland with any secondary spinoff democracy activity. To the extent possible, security officials blocked Internet and social networking originating from Hong Kong. Isolating the democracy is easier since Hong Kong is geographically and socially outside the Chinese mainstream. It is a long way from Beijing where, as the capital, it would be hard to ignore dramatic crowds of protest. Or for that matter, from other major cities to the north such as Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, etc. Even Guangzhou (Canton) has limited regular contact with Hong Kong.With restricted media access and no current politico-economic challenges, Mainlanders are largely indifferent (or believe Hong Kong should abide by the same rules governing them).

Additionally, the likelihood of effective “sanctions” from repressing Hong Kong’s citizens is minimal. China is not invulnerable, but the rest of the world needs China as much if not more than China needs the world. China has become the go-to global factory with few, if any, alternative suppliers for much of their exports. And, while Hong Kong generates profitable financial action, it is not as important as it was in 1997. Beijing could ride out selected economic sanctions. After all, Putin’s Russia has blown off such sanctions, and China’s economic position is significantly stronger.

So we are seeing a protracted waiting game. Democracy advocates still control the streets, but hesitate to take illegal action, like occupying government buildings. The Hong Kong government declines to resign (presumably with Beijing’s backing) but floats off-and-on offers to “negotiate.” They flatly reject the democracy advocates’ reform proposals.

Moreover, exhaustion is a factor. Democracy advocates are divided over means/ends/strategy/tactics. Popular support is ebbing; residents tire of inconvenience; violent confrontations with regime-supporting thugs intimidate others. Hong Kong authorities could clear the streets, regardless of sanguinary consequences. The PRC garrison totals approximately 6,000 troops; it could do the job.

Look for selected arrests and clandestine “disappearances” of key democrats.

The “umbrella revolution” looks ready to fold.

An ancillary observation: such action should put paid to naïve Taiwanese hypothesizing a union with a gracious, accommodating Beijing. Instead, the Taiwan independence movement gets a boost.

(Photos courtesy Reuters)

David T. Jones is a retired State Department Senior Foreign Service Career Officer who has published several hundred books, articles, columns, and reviews on U.S. - Canadian bilateral issues and general foreign policy. During a career that spanned over 30 years, he concentrated on politico-military issues, serving as advisor for two Army Chiefs of Staff. He has just published Alternative North Americas: What Canada and the United States Can Learn from Each Other.