A Revolution in Disarray
It is a truth universally acknowledged that if a monopoly on the use of power goes unchecked, the powerless are likely to feel the consequences.
On Saturday, anger erupted in Cairo’s Tahrir Square once again, taking with it 33 lives. Emblematic of a rebellion gone wrong, the rest of the country – from Alexandria to Suez – has followed suit in the uproar. Once again, plain-clothes thugs have been unleashed and state TV has dissimulated.
The current outcry is partly about this delayed transition to civilian power. It’s a little late in coming, but cries of "The people want to topple the field marshal” – that is, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Head of the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) – are finally reverberating in the region.
The fault lies with Egypt’s dissidents. When former president Hosni Mubarak was ousted, most of them, including Egypt’s silent majority, acquiesced and failed to press the advantages gained, partly for fear of further disrupting the nation’s security. They failed to strike while the iron was hot and Mubarak’s regime was on the run, and that capitulation has come at a dear price.
But is transition to civilian rule the key? Delaying an announcement for elections contributed to the perception that SCAF was holding onto power at all cost. Ongoing violence has pushed that debate past its nexus, giving rise to more concerns. On Tuesday, SCAF committed to a full transition by June 2012 after renewed calls for a timetable – but by nightfall, the damage had already been done.
Tantawi, for his part, has been resolute: In his bullish statement late Tuesday night, he portrayed SCAF as simply doing its job, facing unwarranted attacks while in the service of Egypt. He also offered to step down immediately if a referendum were called. In truth, SCAF’s operational supra-constitutional principles, or the “al-Selmy document” (named after Deputy Premier Ali al-Selmy), was de facto accepted by all seats at the table, despite entrenching military control. Barely an eyelid was batted at SCAF’s clear deference to U.S. directions regarding relations with Israel. Give up that check on power, and watch for the consequences.
Related: Egyptian Cabinet Resigns Amid Protests
SCAF's blueprint for governing was designed to ensure that Islamists would be resolutely held in check by SCAF itself, well after any transitional cabinet was handed over. Indeed, the biggest political bloc, the Muslim Brotherhood, has supported a military stewardship by virtue of not taking it on – showing a remarkable degree of complacency for a party set to gain the most from elections. Worryingly, stipulated electoral rules were so complex and opaque that it almost appeared the government itself could not have been responsible for drafting them. They appeared, rather, to be designed to steer a superficially “democratic” outcome.
All of that seems to have been conveniently forgotten, as protesters once again fill the streets. The cabinet has tendered its resignation, but it is unclear whether SCAF will accept it. It is also unclear what end this will serve, as the violence does not abate.
More problematic is the emergency law, which still stands, and the fact that over 12,000 people are still in military detention (having been there since the start of the rebellion). This is a real cause for crisis that protesters can legitimately seek a resolution for. However, the closed-door trials for prisoners such Mubarak and his sons have wrested the clarity of the rebellion away from its proponents.
Although Tantawi has promised deliverance, the military will act as the military is wont to do: It will continue to preserve its power, and to seek rule by command and control.
If those involved in the rebellion weren’t clear on what the outcomes of the rebellion should be, those outcomes appear even less clear now. Part of this has been the disarray of liberal elites and conservative oppositionists alike. With a divided opposition, major gains such as civilian leadership have fallen to the wayside, as most have foregone coalitions. Delaying elections and finding a fresh fig leaf in the form of a new interim cabinet would only serve to prolong the agony.
Neighbouring examples may hold the key. Tunisians, for instance, have been careful to ensure that the monopoly on the use of force is held in check by the civilian leadership, which continues to insist on a negotiated, political settlement and power-sharing agreements that would forestall a military coup. When the military showed signs of hesitance in abdicating its control, Tunisians pressed hard, and loudly at that, to ensure their rights. Associations sprang up to fill the vacuum of leadership. Egyptians must again look to their neighbour for lessons in how things ought to be done.
Photo courtesy of Reuters
