Just How Dumb Are Russia's Winged Smart Bombs?

Russia’s warplanes have begun making extensive use of cheap, but destructive smart bombs, according to reports from Ukraine’s military and media. As a result, Russian air power may become substantially more effective at hitting targets on or just beyond the frontline.

The UMPK kit—which stands for Unified Module for Gliding and Guidance—transforms a crude ‘dumb’ bomb into a weapon that is (at least in theory) relatively cheap, accurate and useable from a standoff range. Those are all characteristics that spell trouble for Ukraine’s hard-pressed air defense forces.

The new Russian weapons appear inspired by the JDAM precision-guided glide bombs, which entered the U.S. Air Force in the late 1990s and have been employed in every U.S. air campaign since. Because the JDAM was so cheap compared to prior guided weapons, the U.S. military could begin performing precision airstrikes on an unprecedented scale.

While the Soviet Union, and then Russia, had a diverse but limited arsenal of specialized guided bombs—like the KAB-500 and Kh-29 that could be employed for precision strikes on high value targets—it had yet to fully develop and employ its own cheap JDAM-like smart bomb kit until now.

But even as Russia’s air force makes increasing use of UMPK bombs, there are mounting questions as to their effectiveness—especially following an incident in which a Russian bomber dropped two delayed-fuse bombs on the Russian city of Belgorod, causing extensive damage.

Prominent pro-Russian blog Fighter-Bomber alleges these bombs were likely fitted with UMPK kits and were released over Belgorod with the intention of gliding across the bomber to hit Ukraine’s second city, Kharkiv. But the bomb’s pop-out wings either failed to open or blew off, causing the smart weapon to plunge into the Russian city below, destroying vehicles and injuring two people.

More broadly, there is uncertainty whether these weapons are actually benefitting from satellite guidance, or are making do with less effective alternatives.

UMPK: Russia’s JDAM

Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) have generally performed below expectations in the war in Ukraine, as Ukraine’s warplanes and ground-based air defenses survived air defense suppression strikes and inflicted substantial losses in the first few weeks of the war. Since then, Russian jets on ground attack missions have mostly stopped trying to penetrate far into Ukrainian airspace, and have instead moved to hurriedly lobbing unguided bombs and rockets at frontline targets with mediocre accuracy before hi-tailing back to base.

Russian strategic bombers have also launched many cruise missiles at Ukrainian cities and rear-area targets from hundreds of miles away, but large-scale use of these expensive weapons has proven unsustainable.

However, on March 12, debris from the tail of a new glide bomb was spotted in northwestern Donetsk by Ukrainian troops. Then, on March 24th, Russian Su-35S fighters reportedly unleashed 10-11 of the glide bombs on targets in the Sumy Oblast in northeastern Ukraine. That’s on the border with Russia, but nowhere near the current fighting.

The bombardment, in concert with Russian artillery and kamikaze drones, damaged a school and many residential buildings, killing three women taking cover in a specially prepared bomb shelter.

Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat describes the weapon as having the potential to travel “dozens of kilometers,” up to a range of 43 miles. He claimed that “the enemy deploys 10–15, and up to 20, such bombs each day along the entire line of contact, dropped from Su-35 and Su-34 jets outside the range of our air defence systems. This is a threat to us, and we have to urgently respond to it. [sic]”

The Su-34 ‘Fullback’ is a two-seat supersonic bomber that can carry a hulking 15.5 tons of weapons on 12 hardpoints, and has a sensor suite better adapted for using precision guided weapons than most Russian warplanes. The Su-35S is a single-seat fighter primarily assigned to air superiority missions, but which also has relatively modern ground-attack capabilities.

Illya Ponomarenko of the Kyiv Independent reports the UMPK bombs were used effectively, targeting Ukrainian forces entrenched around Avdiivka. Russian troops have captured some ground there in recent months, allegedly “blowing away city blocks.”

In early January of this year, the Russian Fighter-Bomber social media account posted a photo showing a crude kit with tucked-in wings that pop-out after launch, extending the bomb’s range. This weapon appears to be an attachment to the standard 1,100 pound FAB-500 M62 low-drag bomb, widely used by Russian fighter-bombers since 1962.

There are also pop out maneuvering fins, which steer the bombs based on guidance from Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation system. The extendible maneuvering surfaces are apparently an important innovation, as most Russian bombs have welded-in tails.

Fighter-Bomber also claimed, in February, that hundreds of these bombs had already been dropped—though conceded to some flaws for the field-improvised weapons. Then, in April, Fighter-Bomber claimed all bombs being dropped in Ukraine by the VKS were now upgraded with UMPK.

A Russian article says UMPK “function[s] decently” despite being built “in fairly artisanal conditions.” Supposedly, the unit costs 2 million rubles (equivalent to $24,460)—cheap for a guided weapon. Russia’s inventory of unguided aerial bombs runs very deep and will not be prone to exhaustion like its cruise missile arsenal.

A Ukrainian source alleges the half-ton aerial bombs will fall, on average, within 15 to 20 meters of a designated target—adequate given its 140-meter lethal radius against soft targets.

However, other sources have expressed doubt that some, or all, of the bombs actually have satellite guidance installed—saying instead that they may rely on much less accurate inertial navigation. Without satellite guidance, the glide bombs would still have long range, but be reduced to crude area attack munitions effective mostly for terror-bombing civilians (a modus operandi associated with many UMPK attacks so far). A lack of guidance could be explained by a shortage of satellite-navigation components caused by sanctions on Russia.

Military analyst Guy Plopsky, a keen observer of Russian military aviation, tells Popular Mechanics that the bomb’s guidance method couldn’t be discerned in available imagery. “There are few photos available and it’s not obvious from the photos whether the glide kits are satellite-aided or not,” he says. “The Russians claim they are. Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuri Ihnat seemed to state as much recently.”

He also expressed doubt regarding claims that the VKS aircraft were now exclusively using UMPK-enhanced bombs, noting recent photographs showing continued use of unguided bombs.

Alexander Sladkov, a Russian military-affiliated source, alleges 5-7 UMPKs are being dropped daily, and that the total will eventually increase to 40. He also claims the VKS will eventually outfit huge 3,000- and 5,000-kilo bombs with UMPK kits, though kits for those would require much larger wings . He also seemingly claims the VKS was already using 1,500-kilo bombs with UMPK, but that doesn’t appear to be accurate yet, and may be conflating with the non-kit based UPAB-1500 (see below).

Given the qualifications that even Russian sources make regarding the weapon, it’s likely the UMPKs perform with less range and accuracy than a JDAM bomb. That, however, does not preclude their being an effective addition to Russia’s aerial arsenal.

Mysterious Origins

Some commentators associate the new weapon with a GPS-guided kit proposed in the 2000s by Russian arms manufacturer NPO Bazalt. However, concept art of this UMPK reveals a completely different configuration than those seen in Ukraine.

In that decade, Russia’s military opted instead to install a GPS-based aiming system called the SVP-24 Gefest on its planes instead of bombs. This high-altitude bombing system demonstrated only middling effectiveness when tested in combat over Syria—initially landing on average within 100 meters of target—and has limited applications in the current conflict due to Ukraine’s higher-altitude air defenses.

The VKS also fields several purpose-designed glide bombs, including the massive 3,306-lb satellite-guided KAB-1500S-E glide bomb with an effective range of 31 miles, and the smaller UPAB-500B (1,230 pounds) with a range of 25 miles that lands on average within 7-12 meters of target.

While these weapons have seen some use, it appears they number too few to be used broadly. Nonetheless, Russian propaganda channels recently claimed—without evidence—that that UPABs were successfully employed against a Ukrainian column near Ughledar on April 6.

Russian Forpost-R and Orion combat drones also employ their own miniature glide bombs, the laser-guided KAB-20L (46 pounds), the satellite-guided KAB-50S (110+ pounds), and the UPAB-50, the last of which uses the warhead of a Grad rocket.

What the Bombs Can Do—and How Ukraine Can Respond

Admittedly, the use of these new glide bombs may be restricted depending on their mode of employment. It’s unclear whether they are pre-targeted before launch or are assigned coordinates midflight. The latter could enable much more timely and tactically relevant strikes, but would also likely require coordination with observing platforms that can detect targets, determine their GPS coordinates, and transmit them to the bomb-carrying aircraft.

Another issue is that GPS-guided weapons don’t work well against moving targets, though devising alternate kits for laser or TV guidance could solve that problem.

A final consideration is that glide bombs only achieve maximum range when released at high altitudes—altitudes at which carrying warplanes will be maximally visible to enemy radars and vulnerable to long-range air defenses. This will limit how far Russian warplanes (and Ukrainian ones armed with JDAMS) can safely fly before releasing their glide bombs.

Nonetheless, a larger volume precision glide bomb arsenal could allow high-flying Russian warplanes to launch precision ground attacks against Ukrainian positions on the frontline, as well as artillery, air defenses, HQs and supply hubs situated a few dozen miles behind it.

All that without having to descend to an altitude that short-range air defenses (like Stinger or Starstreak missiles) cover, nor fly in close enough to the no-escape zone of medium/long-range Buk and S-300 air-defense batteries. The latter class of air defense weapons have a range of 20-45 miles, but are too valuable to be deployed particularly close to the frontline. Situated a safe distance back, they would be at the limits of their effective range against glide-bomb delivering jets.

Ihnat stressed in a statement that the only effective counter would be longer-range Western air defense missile. “For now, we have no equipment that would allow us to effectively respond. In order to push those jets further away from our borders, we need long-range air defence systems like Patriot, as well as, of course, modern multi-purpose fighter jets [sic],” he said.

While Patriot batteries would have the needed reach, they bring with them a dilemma—whether it’s better to deploy near major population centers like Kyiv to defend against missiles, or forward to support ground forces. In the latter scenario, the Patriots would have more opportunities to shoot down Russian warplanes, but would also be more exposed to attacks.

Another solution—obtaining modern Western jet fighters like the F-16 or Gripen that can threaten Russian jets from afar with effective long-range air-to-air missiles—unfortunately seems to not be on the table for now.

Ukraine may also increasingly employ satellite-signal jamming or spoofing to misdirect the GLONASS-guided bombs, though these may only provide local-area protection. Recent reports indicate that U.S.-supplied JDAM bombs have proven ineffective thanks to reactive use of GPS-spoofing by Russian air defenses. It’s possible Ukraine is already using similar techniques, limiting the UMPK’s effectiveness, too.

Another key question is how quickly Russia can manufacture and install kits for these smart bombs, which will likely rely in part on imported or illegally smuggled microelectronic components from abroad. If Russia can produce, say, 20 UMPK kits per day, sustained use of these weapons becomes far more viable than the expensive ballistic and cruise missiles produced in single digit quantities each month.

For now, it’s unclear how extensive and sustainable Russian production of UMPK kits truly is. Their introduction, however, confirms the Russian military’s continuing adaptations in response to setbacks in Ukraine, and is possibly an ominous harbinger of a more effective role played by Russian fixed-wing aviation in the coming months.

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