Russia Is Buying and Weaponizing Cheap Drones From Chinese Websites

russian engineer designs military drones
Russia Buying, Modding Cheap Drones From AlibabaAnadolu Agency - Getty Images
  • Ukrainian forces reportedly downed a civilian drone that Russia may have bought from an online Chinese marketplace.

  • The drone appears to be a Mugin-4 from the company Mugin UAV, which is based in China.

  • Ukraine has used this kind of drone to deliver kamikaze attacks against Russia.


On February 15, photos surfaced online of a crashed, orange-colored civilian drone toting a naval cannon shell reportedly downed by Ukrainian forces in the southern Kherson oblast. The crashed drone appears physically intact, implying it may have broken down, or been hijacked or compelled to land after losing its command link.

This hybrid vertical takeoff or landing (VTOL) drone—which can switch between helicopter and airplane-style flight modes—is painted bright orange and appears to be a Mugin-4 sold on the civilian market by the company Mugin UAV, based in Xiamen in the Fujian province of China. Camera drones produced by the firm have notably been adapted and employed by Ukraine to deliver numerous kamikaze attacks targeting more distant Russian military bases. Now, Russia also appears to be getting in on the act.

The Twitter account Ukraine Weapon Tracker identifies the munition slung on a bomb rack under the fuselage as a 76-millimeter OF-62 high-explosive fragmentation shell weighing 27 pounds, ordinarily used by rapid-firing naval guns. Though small compared to a typical aerial bomb or artillery shell, that’s a lot punchier than the third- or half-pound 30- or 40-millimeter grenades often dropped by weaponized civilian drone in Ukraine.

“For Sevastopol” is inscribed on the shell, implying a mission to avenge Ukrainian raids on Russian military facilities on the Crimean port city made by the same family of drones.

Most famously, in July 2022, a Mugin-5 Pro drone evaded a storm of anti-aircraft gunfire to smash into the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, injuring six and leading to cancellation of Navy Day celebration.

These drones could be readily purchased via China’s AliExpress online shopping mega-platform owned by Alibaba Group, so they came to be dubbed the “Alibaba drones.”

Manufacturer Mugin UAV has stated it condemns weaponization of its drone and doesn’t permit direct sales to Ukraine or Russia. But both countries are obviously acquiring the affordable drones via agents, civilian donors, or other third parties.

Indeed, the most common civilian drones in use by Russian and Ukrainian forces are quadcopters built by Chinese manufacturer DJI, particularly the Mavic and larger Matrices camera drones. These small drones are most useful for acquiring targets for artillery strikes, but can also be jury-rigged to carry grenades or mortar shells, which can be dropped with startling precision. DJI first-person-view (FPV) racing drones are also seeing increasing use modified for kamikaze attacks.

Despite a Chinese ban on exporting drones directly to Ukraine and Russia, thousands have made their way there through third-party donors. Soldiers on both sides have also worked to jailbreak civilian drones to override vulnerabilities due to safety software.

Quadcopter drones are especially versatile thanks to their VTOL capability, doing away with the need of a catapult or runway. But that flight mode is much more inefficient than fixed-wing drones in terms of range and speed, limiting their reach.

The Mugin, like other hybrid drones, overcomes this problem thanks to its two propulsion systems: between four and eight rotors useable for VTOL wherever is convenient; and a rear-mounted pusher propeller for more efficient cruising. The resulting increased range and payload capacity makes them far more applicable for long-distance attacks.

The guidance method used by Ukraine, however, remains unclear. It’s possible the drones simply proceed to pre-assigned GPS coordinates. Alternately, an operator within range of the target may remotely control them in the terminal phase. Hypothetically, an operator could also leverage the drone’s vertical flight mode to accurately release munitions without crashing the drone itself, though it’s unclear whether any Mugins have been used for non-kamikaze attacks.

Currently, there are five generations of Mugin hybrid drones—the Mugin 2 through 6—available for purchase at prices ranging from $7,000 to $15,000 on the company website. The latest models substitute fiber glass with carbon fiber, a reinforced composite plastic which is light, but very rigid and durable. There are also two electrically powered models, the EV350 and EV460.

Speed (Max/Cruise)

Endurance

Max Payload

Mugin-4 4720

71.5mph /62mph

3 hours

17.6 lb

Mugin 4000 Pro

67mph/51 mph

5 hours

11 lb

Mugin-5 Pro

93 mph/74.5 mph

7 hours

55 lbs.

Mugin-5 Pro (8 rotor)

85 mph/78 mph

4-8 hours

33 lb.

Attack of the Alibaba Drones

Before the heavily publicized July attack on Sevastopol, the drone’s first offensive use by Ukraine may have been a destructive attack targeting an oil refinery on Russian soil at Novoshakhtinsk, near Rostov on June 22.

However, Russian air and naval bases in Crimea subsequently became the primary target of Mugin attacks. Between August 20-23, additional Alibaba drones swooped down on Sevastopol with one apparently hitting the roof the fleet HQ. At night, the sky was routinely slashed by air defense missiles and cannon fire.

On September 22, five more descended upon Crimea, but were reported downed short of target. Nine Alibaba drones also attacked in concert with drone kamikaze boats on October 29.

In the wee hours of Christmas Eve 2022, Russian sources allege seven Ukrainian-operated Mugins launched from Odessa in the evening (7:30 p.m.) and flew across the Black toward targets 180 to 206 miles away. Supposedly five were destroyed en route by defending S-300 and Pantsir-S1 air defense systems, and two were downed just short of their intended targets.

Overall, Russia appears to have improved its defenses in Crimea against drone attacks, though forcing Moscow to commit resources to do so is a partial victory. Every missile launched to swat an Alibaba drone costs 10 to 40 times more than the target—a material dilemma also faced by Ukrainian air defenses when repelling Russia’s Iranian-built Shahed-136 kamikaze drones daily assailing Ukrainian cities.

Despite using the Shahed-136, Russia’s military apparently seems to have seen the appeal of buying even cheaper Mugins hybrid UAVs purchasable in China that don’t require special launchers. The high-visibility orange paint on the downed Mugin could also mean it may earlier have been used for air defense practice, thereby helping Russian air defense units learn to detect, identify, and engage future attacks.

You Might Also Like